The stagnation of international law by Pauwelyn, Joost et al.
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
qhdjsqjj 
 
Working Paper No. 97 – October 2012 
 
 
THE STAGNATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
Joost Pauwelyn 
Ramsel A. Wessel 
Jan Wouters 
1 
 
THE STAGNATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Joost Pauwelyn 
Ramses A. Wessel 
Jan Wouters 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Traditional international law and its instruments are stagnating both in terms of 
quantity and quality. New, alternative forms of cross-border cooperation, in particular 
processes of informal international lawmaking, have emerged and gained 
prominence since the 2000s in response to an increasingly diverse, networked, and 
knowledge-based society. This transformation impacts on the three axes of actors, 
processes and outputs in the international legal order. We challenge the assumption 
that traditional international law is, by definition, legitimate and that this would not be 
the case for new forms of informal lawmaking: whereas traditional international law is 
often based on “thin state consent”, a “thick stakeholder consensus” underlies many 
of the new forms of cooperation. It is submitted that the evolution in the international 
legal order demands an adjustment of models to keep both new forms of cooperation 
and traditional international law in check. This paper thereto assesses the legitimacy 
of international legal processes, tackling also the question whether new forms benefit 
powerful actors and how to keep activity accountable, both domestically and 
internationally, towards internal and external stakeholders, through ex ante, ongoing 
and ex post control mechanisms, involving not only managerial or administrative 
checks and balances but also political and judicial oversight. The paper furthermore 
examines whether some of the new outputs of international cooperation could 
already be seen as part of traditional international law and how traditional and new 
forms are (or could be) interacting before international courts and tribunals. To 
conclude, a redefinition of the academic discipline of international law to keep both 
the field and its students sociologically relevant is proposed. 
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 4  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a mantra amongst international lawyers that the field of international law is 
expanding, exponentially.1 This trend, also referred to as the legalization of world 
politics2, may have been true until a decade ago. It is highly questionable today. 
International law is stagnating both in terms of quantity and quality. Drawing on a 
two-year research project on “informal international lawmaking” (involving over forty 
scholars and thirty case studies)3, this paper offers evidence in support of the 
stagnation hypothesis (section 2), evaluates the likely reasons for it (section 3) and 
weighs possible options in response (section 4). It illustrates with a historical account 
that the international legal order has radically transformed in the past – on all three 
axes of actors, processes and outputs – so that the conceptual boundaries of how 
international law may look in the future are wide open (section 5). The article next 
assesses the legitimacy of both new forms of cooperation and traditional 
international law (section 6), tackling also the question of whether new forms benefit 
powerful actors and how to keep activity accountable, both domestically and 
internationally, toward internal and external stakeholders, through ex ante, ongoing 
and ex post control mechanisms, involving not only managerial or administrative 
checks and balances but also political and judicial oversight (section 7). Finally, 
focusing on the short to medium term, the paper questions whether some of the new 
outputs of international cooperation could already be seen as part of traditional 
international law and how traditional and new forms are (or could be) interacting 
before international courts and tribunals (section 8). In this respect, it proposes 
certain procedural meta-norms against which new cooperation forms ought to be 
checked, which we refer to as “thick stakeholder consensus” imposing limits in 
respect of actors (authority), process and output. Intriguingly, this benchmark may be 
normatively superior (rather than inferior) to the validation requirements of traditional 
international law, coined here as “thin state consent”. In this sense, international law 
is stagnating not only in quantity but also quality. Section 9 offers conclusions.    
 
2. EVIDENCE OF THE SLOWDOWN 
 
For each decade since the 1950s, the number of new multilateral treaties deposited 
with the UN Secretary General was around thirty-five.4 In the ten years between 
2000 and 2010, this number dropped quite dramatically to twenty (in the preceding 
five decades it had never been below thirty-four). Between 2005 and 2010, only nine 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, José Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 213 
(2002) at 216 (“There is little doubt that recent decades have witnessed a striking proliferation 
in treaties, including multilateral agreements”) and Anne Peters, The Growth of International 
Law between Globalization and the Great Power in 8 Austrian Review of International and 
European Law (2003) 109-140 at 109 (“International Law is not only growing fast, but is 
virtually exploding”). 
2
 J. Goldstein et al. (eds.), Legalization and World Politics (Boston, MIT Press, 2001). 
3
 The project was funded by the Hague Institute for the Internationalization of Law (HiiL). See 
the project website at www.informallaw.org and also Informal International Lawmaking (J. 
Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel and J. Wouters, eds.), Oxford University Press, 2012 (hereafter 
referred to as “OUP book”) and Informal International Lawmaking: Case Studies (J. 
Pauwelyn, R.A. Wessel, J, Wouters, A. Berman and S. Duquet, eds.), TOAEP, 2012 
(hereafter referred to as “TOAEP book”). 
4
 36 in the 1950s; 35 in the 1960s; 36 in the 1970s; 34 in the 1980s and 37 in the 1990s, see 
UN Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General (MTDSG, 
totalling 507 at the time of writing), available at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/DB.aspx?path=DB/MTDSG/page1_en.xml&menu=MTDSG 
(counting only new multilateral treaties and not including amendments, protocols or annexes 
to existing multilateral agreements). Note, of course, that there is no guarantee that all 
multilateral treaties that have been concluded are also actually deposited with the UN. Yet, 
these UN numbers do give us a sense of multilateral treaty activity over time. 
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new multilateral treaties were deposited (in 2011, not a single one).5 The broader UN 
Treaty Series database confirms this downward trend as of the 2000s, both for 
bilateral treaties (12566 concluded in the 1990s; only 9484 concluded in the 2000s) 
and multilateral treaties (406 entries in the 1990s; down to 262 in the 2000s).6 
Looking at individual countries, in the 1990s, 210 treaties were transmitted to the US 
Senate. In the 2000s, this number was down to 136.7 Similarly, the number of 
international agreements reported to the US Congress under the Case Act8 has 
fallen significantly and consistently in the last six year, from 313 in 2006 to 288 in 
2007, 236 in 2008, 232 in 2009, 197 in 2010 and only 166 in 2011.9 In France as well 
we see a significant dip in the number of treaties reported, by date of signature, from 
1152 in the 1990s to 991 in the 2000s.10 Most tellingly, the number of multilateral 
treaties (including such things as protocols, amendments and annexes to existing 
multilateral treaties, but excluding European treaties) was down from 206 in the 
1990s to only 90 in the 2000s.11 The official treaty database of the Netherlands 
reports a similar decline: from 1427 treaty entries in the 1990s to 1197 in the 2000s. 
Tellingly, amongst this treaty activity, the number of hits under multilateral treaties is 
down from 619 to 587.12 Belgium’s treaty record displays a similar tendency.13 
  
Anecdotally, these numbers make sense. Which is the most recent multilateral treaty 
that you can think of? The UN database lists the International Cocoa Agreement of 
June 2010, replacing a similar agreement of 2001. Better known may be the 2003 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).14 Yet, subsequent WHO efforts 
to tackle problems related to diet and alcohol were not enshrined in a formal treaty 
                                                 
5
 Significantly, when looking at five year periods, the numbers are down from 20 (1990-1995) 
to 17 (1995-2000), 12 (2000-2005) and 9 (2005-2010). When counting not only new 
multilateral agreements deposited but all entries into the UN MTDSG database (including 
such things as amendments, protocols and annexes) the downward trend as of 2000 is 
confirmed: 102 entries in the 1970s; 99 in the 1980s; 109 in the 1990s (the highest number 
since recording started); and a decline to 77 in the 2000s (the lowest number since the 
1960s, when 57 entries were recorded).  
6
 See UN Treaty Series (UNTS) available at 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/UNTSOnline.aspx?id=1. Multilateral treaties in this database 
include closed multilateral treaties, multilateral treaties deposited with the UN SG, multilateral 
not deposited with the UN SG and open multilateral treaties. 
7
 Numbers are taken from The Library of Congress available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/treaties/treaties.html. 
8
 By statute, 1 U.S.C. 112b(a) , the US Secretary of State is required to transmit to the US 
Congress the text of any “international agreement” other than a “treaty” (in the sense of 
Article II:2 of the US Constitution, that is a treaty to be submitted for approval by 2/3 of the 
US Senate). Such other “international agreements” are not “treaties” in the US constitutional 
sense but are legally binding under international law. They include so-called executive 
agreements and congressional-executive agreements (none of which are adopted by 2/3 of 
the US Senate). See more on this below in footnote 122 
9
 Numbers are taken from the US Department of State website available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/caseact/. 
10
 Numbers are taken from the French government’s Base des traités et des accords 
available at http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/Traites/Accords_Traites.php.  
11
 Since the 1930s, when the total number of multilateral treaties was 65, this number had 
never fallen below 135, the number in the 1940s, with a peak of 265 in the 1950s. 
12
 Numbers are taken from the official Dutch Verdragenbank available at 
www.minbuza.nl/producten-en-diensten/verdragen. 
13
 For the 1990s 813 research results can be found through 
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/wet/wet.htm whereas for the 2000s only 407 results were 
found. The picture may be slightly affected by the slower pace of publication of approval laws 
due to the involvement of a high number of parliamentary assemblies for so-called ‘mixed 
treaties’ and the political crisis between 2008-2011. 
14
 Adopted by the World Health Assembly in 2003 and in force in 2005, available at 
http://www.who.int/fctc/en/. 
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like the FCTC but rather in non-binding guiding principles part of a Global Strategy 
on diet (200415) and alcohol (201016). If anything, what reaches the headlines is the 
multilateral agreements that fail to be concluded, be it the WTO’s Doha Round of 
trade negotiations (deadlocked for over ten years) or the UNFCCC’s attempts to 
negotiate a successor to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change.  Even in 
today’s most dynamic and studied sub-branch of international law – international 
investment law – a marked slowdown has taken place in the number of investment 
treaties concluded since the late 2000s.17  Another indication of the tendency away 
from traditional international lawmaking is the follow-up given to draft texts prepared 
by the International Law Commission (ILC).  Whereas the ILC’s work previously 
resulted often in new multilateral treaties (e.g. the 1969, 1978, 1983 and 1986 
Vienna Conventions on treaty law) the most recent time this happened was the 2004 
UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property, following 
the ILC’s 1991 draft articles on this matter. 
 
Policy preferences expressed by a number of states confirm the stagnation 
hypothesis and are likely to further strengthen it in the future. In Germany, for 
example, federal ministries are instructed, “before international law treaties … are 
elaborated on and concluded”, to “check whether a binding contract under 
international law is irrefutable or whether the same goal may also be attained 
through other means, especially through understandings which are below the 
threshold of an international agreement”.18 Similarly, Canada’s policy is that “if a 
matter is of a routine or technical nature, or appears to fall entirely within the existing 
mandate and responsibility of a department or agency, and if it does not contain 
substantive matter which should be legally binding in public international law, it is 
often preferable to deal with the matter through the use of a non-legally binding 
instrument”.19 The 2010 US National Security Strategy, in turn, refers to the 
“shortcomings of international institutions that were developed to deal with the 
challenges of an earlier time” and calls on US authorities “to spur and harness a new 
diversity of instruments, alliances, and institutions”.20 
  
Some may object that the picture outlined above fails to take into account other 
dynamics of international law, such as the continuing evolution of customary 
international law, the on-going activity of international organizations and the steady 
production of case law by international courts and tribunals. As to customary law, 
                                                 
15
 Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health, adopted by the World Health 
Assembly in 2004, available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/en/. 
16
 Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol, adopted by the World Health 
Assembly in 2010, available at 
http://www.who.int/substance_abuse/activities/globalstrategy/en/. 
17
 See A. Aaken, ‘The International Investment Protection Regime through the Lens of 
Economic Theory,’ in: The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration, Waibel, Kaushal, Chung 
and Balchin (eds.), Chapter 23; S. Jandhyala, W. Henisz, and E. Mansfield, ‘Three Waves of 
BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy,’ 55 Journal of Conflict Resolution 
(2011) 1047-1073. 
18
 Bundesregierung, Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien (2009) 
<http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/139852/publicationFile/55730/ggo.pdf.> 
accessed 26.10.2011. Author’s translation. The original text reads: ‚Vor der Ausarbeitung und 
dem Abschluss völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Staatsverträge, Regierungsübereinkünfte, 
Ressortabkommen, Noten- und Briefwechsel) hat das federführende Bundesministerium 
stets zu prüfen, ob eine völkervertragliche Regelung unabweisbar ist oder ob der verfolgte 
Zweck auch mit anderen Mitteln erreicht werden kann, insbesondere auch mit Absprachen 
unterhalb der Schwelle eines völkerrechtlichen Vertrags.’ 
19
 Canada Treaty Information, ‘Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament’ (2011), Annex C 
<www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/procedure.asp>. 
20
 US National Security Strategy, 27 May 2010, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 
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although we agree that intensified international interaction may lead to a more rapid 
formation of customary rules in specific instances21, today’s preference of States for 
non-binding arrangements obviously also impacts upon customary law, as the 
essence of the latter’s opinio juris component relates precisely to the legally binding 
character of an obligation.22 Moreover, with fewer multilateral conventions generated 
it becomes harder to find strong evidence of opinio juris confirmed by practice.23 As 
to the output of international organizations, although they obviously continue to 
function and produce plenty of resolutions, statements and decisions, many of the 
normative instruments they recently produced or endorsed are legally non-binding, 
such as the Guidelines for Implementation of the FCTC.24 Moreover, many of the 
classical multilateral institutions currently face serious challenges, from deep 
divisions at the UN Security Council25 to immobilism at the WTO26, severe budget 
cuts or even membership dropout in a variety of organizations27 and difficult reform 
                                                 
21
 See e.g. with an emphasis on the significance of certain General Assembly resolutions 
during times of fundamental change, M.P. Scharf, Seizing the ‘Grotian Moment’: Accelerated 
Formation of Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 Cornell 
International Law Journal (2011), 439. 
22
 See inter alia ICJ, Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against 
Nicaragua – Merits (Nicaragua / United States), judgment of 27 June 1986, I.C.J. Rep. 1986, 
14, para. 188. Cf. Jutta Brunnée, book review ‘Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles in 
Modern International Environmental Law, by H. Hohmann’, 33 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law (1996), 484, at 487. 
23
 Ibid., para. 183; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), I.C.J. Rep. 1985, p. 13, 
para. 27, as recently confirmed in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany/Italy: 
Greece Intervening), para. 55.  
24
 See, for example, José Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Jonathan G.S. Koppell, World Rule. Accountability, Legitimacy, and 
the Design of Global Governance (The University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
25
 Illustrative of those divisions are the three recent joint vetoes expressed by Russia and 
China on draft UN Security Council resolutions regarding Syria, respectively on 4 October 
2011, 4 February 2012 and 19 July 2012. Interestingly, this has led to a remarkable 
resolution of the UN General Assembly adopted on 3 August 2012, A/RES/66/253, overtly 
criticizing the Security Council for its failure to take action on the Syria crisis. 
26
 See inter alia Joost Pauwelyn, The WTO in Crisis: Five Fundamentals Reconsidered, WTO 
Public Forum, September 2012, at 
http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/public_forum12_e/art_pf12_e/article_e.htm?art=9; 
Mehdi Abbas, De Doha à Cancún: éléments d’analyse de la crise du multilatéralisme 
commerciale et de l’organisation mondiale du commerce, 6 Annuaire Français des Relations 
Internationales (2005), 880-900.  
27
 The 2008 financial crisis has led to severe cuts in membership contributions to a variety of 
organizations. See, for example, as to the 2012-2013 budget of the Council of Europe: ‘The 
Programme and Budget 2012-2013 is geared towards a strict control of expenditure, 
including significant reductions in staff and the redeployment of resources to priority sectors 
in the area of Human Rights, Rule of Law and Democracy with greater emphasis on field 
activities and the effectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms to achieve better co-ordination 
of activities, increased efficiency and higher impact’ (available at 
http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=budget). As to the UN, in its Resolution 
A/RES/66/248 of 24 December 2011 the UN General Assembly for the first time in 50 years 
decided to reduce the biannual (2012-2013) budget of the UN with 5%, in spite of the 
continued new demands upon the organization. Governments have recently also conducted 
critical reviews of the added value of the work of multilateral organizations, especially in the 
global development effort: see inter alia Australian Government/Australian AID, Australian 
Multilateral Assessment (March 2012); DFID, Multilateral Aid Review. Taking Forward the 
Findings of the UK Multilateral Aid Review (March 2011); Adrien Gouteyron, Rapport 
d’information fait au nom de la commission des finances sur les contributions financières de 
la France aux organisations internationales, Sénat, No 390, 2010-2011; Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken, Samenwerken aan mondiale uitdagingen. Nederland en multilaterale 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking (April 2009).  
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processes.28 Unlike the post-cold war enthusiasm of the 1990s there is a rather 
broad acknowledgment that traditional forms of multilateralism are facing a deep 
crisis. It is partly because of the dissatisfaction with the rigidities and inadequacies of 
classical international institutions that governments have turned to informal 
cooperative fora, from the Kimberley Scheme to the G-20. Although international 
courts and tribunals continue their steady output, they mainly contribute – as they 
should - to the interpretation and clarification of existing international law rather than 
to developing new legal norms and principles.29 Moreover, most of these (quasi-) 
judicial bodies were set up in the late twentieth century.  No new international court 
with broad jurisdiction has been conceived in the twenty-first century.30 
 
3. REASONS EXPLAINING THE SLOWDOWN 
 
Is the stagnation of international law due to fewer cross-border contacts or 
problems? We doubt it.  If anything, interdependence continues to increase.  Some 
of the slowdown may be explained by the fact that treaties now exist on many of the 
major questions. Yet, most of the numbers above also include updates or 
amendments to existing treaties and also those numbers are down. In addition, new 
matters continue to arise so that, at least in the five decades from 1950 to 2000, the 
number of new treaties has followed an upward trend.  Is it because interests 
increasingly diverge so that finding solutions becomes more difficult? Some of this is 
certainly happening and we will return to it. Yet, it does not explain the basic 
paradigm shift. Whereas treaties and international law stagnate, a rich tapestry of 
novel forms of cooperation, ostensibly outside international law, is thriving. It is not 
that cross-border agreement can no longer be found. It is simply that it takes 
different forms and involves a different constellation of actors and processes, outside 
the traditional confines of international law.  The nomenclature used is increasingly 
diverse and creative, everything but the formal terms treaty, agreement or 
international organization. Instead, we have witnessed the creation of the 
International Conference on Harmonization (in respect of registration of 
pharmaceuticals), the Wassenaar Arrangement on export controls of conventional 
arms, the Kimberley Scheme on conflict diamonds, the Proliferation Security 
Initiative31, the International Competition Network, the Copenhagen Accord on 
climate change, the ISO 26000 Standard on social responsibility, the Group of 20 (G-
20), the Financial Stability Board, the Ruggie Guiding Principles on Business and 
                                                 
28
 E.g. the ever-ongoing talks on the reform of the UN Security Council: see inter alia Yehuda 
Z. Blum, Proposals for UN Security Council Reform, 99 American Journal of International 
Law (2005), 632-649; Shashi Tharoor, Security Council Reform: Past, Present, and Future, 
25 Ethics and International Affairs (2011), 397-406; Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys, Security 
Council Reform: a New Veto for a New Century? 44 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la 
Guerre (2005), 139-174; or the slow implementation of the reform of the IMF decided by the 
G20 in 2010 in order to accommodate the BRIC countries : G20, ‘Communiqué Meeting of 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’, Gyeongju, Republic of Korea, 23 October 
2010, par. 5, http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20finance101023.html.  
29
 See, however, as to the impact of the case law of international criminal tribunals on 
customary international law and on domestic legal systems, Roozbeh B. Baker, Customary 
International Law in the 21
st
 Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, 21 European 
Journal of International Law (2010), 173. 
30
 Admittedly, the UN Security Council set up an ad hoc international criminal tribunal with 
very circumscribed jurisdiction to handle the killing of Lebanon’s former prime minister Rafiq 
Hariri with UNSC Res 1757 of 30 May 2007. 
31
 John Yoo and Glenn Sulmasy, ‘The Proliferation Security Initiative: a model for 
international cooperation’, 35 Hofstra L. Rev. (2004) 405. 
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Human Rights32, the Internet Engineering Task Force, the Global Strategy on Diet, 
and the list goes on.33  
  
Manifestly, a lot was worked out or agreed on in the last decade. Only, much of it 
was set out in new forms and new processes outside both traditional international 
law and traditional international organizations. As Jim Leape, Director General of 
WWF International, put it on his return from what many regard as a failed Rio+20 
Conference in June 2012:  “It’s Happening, but Not in Rio”.34   Jan Klabbers goes as 
far as stating that “[g]lobalization seems to have bypassed the discipline of 
international law completely”.35 Willke points at “a dramatic tension between the post-
modern dynamic of globalization and a pre-modern state of global decision-
making”.36 What explains this trend, which we have referred to elsewhere as the rise 
of “informal” international lawmaking (IN-LAW)37? In our view, it is deep societal 
changes that are not unique to international law but affect both international and 
national legal systems.38 In the United States, for example, the number of formal 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations adopted each year in accordance 
with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) rulemaking procedures declined 
dramatically since the mid 1990s.  By contrast, in the same period, there has been a 
striking increase in the number of FDA-issued documents intended to give guidance 
                                                 
32
 See Business and Human Rights at a Crossroads: the Legacy of John Ruggie (R. Mares, 
editor) (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden and Boston, 2011); K. Buhmann, 78 Nordic Journal of 
International Law (2009) 1-52. 
33
 Whereas the stagnation of treaty activity can be empirically demonstrated (based, at least, 
on what states report, see above), the rise in these informal or non-traditional forms of 
cooperation is more difficult to document. By their nature and informal character, actors 
involved (including public authorities) often do not report them (a problem we return to 
below). It is therefore extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the universe of this 
activity or to say with certainty that it has increased in the last decade or two. That said, 
anecdotal evidence and the empirical research we were able to conduct, including over thirty 
case studies (see www.informallaw.org), confirms their rise, in particular since the late 1990s. 
On top of the examples listed above see e.g. the International Strategy for Disaster 
Reduction (1999), the World Anti-Doping Agency (1999), the Andean Committee for the 
Defence of Competition (2005), the Central American Group of Competition (2006), the UN 
Principles for Responsible Investment (2006), the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (2009), the Global Network Initiative (2008, see http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org), 
the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (2011). Many of these are discussed in 
the OUP and TOAEP books supra note 1. 
34
 New York Times, 24 June 2012 (“The text finally agreed upon here in Rio is a passing 
description of ‘the future we want,’ but it does not set us on the path to get there. Yet there is 
hope. If you looked around in Rio last week, you saw where the action really is — local and 
national governments, companies, NGOs, labor unions finding ways to get on with it”). 
35
 Jan Klabbers, The Idea(s) of International Law, in The Law of the Future and the Future of 
Law (eds. Muller, Zouridis, Frishman and Kistemaker, 2011), 69 at 71. 
36
 Helmut Willke, Governance In A Disenchanted World, The End Of Moral Society (2009) at 
6 (referring to “a world society which is lacking institutions of central political decision-making 
– and is substituting this deficiency with considerable capacities of self-organization and 
decentralized governance”). 
37
 We defined “ informal international lawmaking » (IN-LAW) as follows : “Cross-border 
cooperation between public authorities, with or without the participation of private actors 
and/or international organisations, in a forum other than a traditional international 
organisation (process informality), and/or as between actors other than traditional diplomatic 
actors (such as regulators or agencies) (actor informality) and/or which does not result in a 
formal treaty or other traditional source of international law (output informality)” (Pauwelyn, 
Chapter 1, OUP book). 
38
 On the emergence of new actors and forms in domestic legal systems see Eberhard 
Bohne, Der informale Rechtsstaat (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1981) and Flückiger, chapter 
19 in OUP book. 
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to the regulated industry but not adopted through public procedures.39 Also within the 
European Union (EU) informal cooperation and the establishment of agencies have 
increased considerably since the 2000s.40  The societal undercurrents explaining this 
trend toward “informality” involving new actors, new processes and new outputs – 
referred to below as the emergence of an increasingly diverse and complex 
network/knowledge society – go far beyond the traditional, functional explanations 
for informal cooperation or “soft law” conventionally discussed in the literature (e.g. 
the relative costs and benefits related to formal versus informal agreements).41 
 
a. An increasingly diverse network society 
 
Firstly, we are witnessing a move from societies of individuals (at the national level) 
and a society of territorial states (at the international level) to an increasingly 
transnational society of networks.42 These networks both disaggregate the state and 
transcend the state. Within states, new internationally active actors have emerged 
which cooperate with their counterparts across borders, be they industry or sector 
specific regulators, competition authorities, central banks, provinces or cities, judges 
or parliaments. Beyond states, new actors have converged not on national, let alone 
sub-national interests of the nation state, but on economic or societal interests that 
span across territories, be it transnational corporations whose fortunes are spread 
across the globe, single-issue, global NGOs (think of Amnesty International or 
Médecins sans Fontières) or international coalitions of consumers, farmers, workers 
or other special interests or citizen groups.  
 
On top of that also the number of states themselves has increased and, more 
importantly, the power differences between some of them have flattened. Whereas 
the cold war period pitted two blocks against each other (with a Third World rising in 
the background), the specter of sole US hegemony did not outlive the 1990s for long. 
Most characteristic of the 2000s is the emergence of new powers such as China, 
Brazil, India and South Africa, each pulling more weight around, making firmer 
claims and seeking their own interests (economic, political and ideological). This 
diversity has given rise to new clashes and divisions and has not made consent-
based solutions easier on topics ranging from trade and climate change to finance, 
                                                 
39
 See John C. Carey, The FDA's Policymaking Quandary: Is Guidance Reform an 
Appropriate Solution (1997) (unpublished work), quoted in Todd D. Rakoff, The Choice 
Between Formal and Informal Modes of Administrative Regulation 52 Administrative Law 
Review (2000) 159. 
40
 See Vos, chapter 17 in OUP book, D. Geradin, N. Petit and R. Munoz (eds) Regulation 
through Agencies: A New Paradigm for EC Governance (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2005) 
and M. Busuioc, The Accountability of European Agencies, Legal Provisions and Ongoing 
Practices (Eburon, Delft 2010). 
41
 See Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International Instruments, 35 ICLQ 
1986, 787-812; Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 
International Organization 1991, 495-538. 
42
 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, Princeton University Press, 2004. KENNETH W. 
ABBOTT AND DUNCAN SNIDAL, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational 
New Governance, 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2009). 
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human rights, access to raw materials and energy.43  At the same time, it has also 
created and enabled new alliances and networks such as the BRICS44 and G-20.  
 
This diverse network society has given rise to new actors and new forms or 
processes of cooperation, other than those traditionally recognized by international 
law.45 The state remains a pivotal entity of interest aggregation, legitimation and 
control. Yet, it is supplemented, assisted, corrected and continuously challenged by 
a variety of other actors be they regulators, national and international agencies, city 
mayors, businesses or NGOs who can make cooperation not only more legitimate 
but also more effective.  
 
b. An increasingly complex knowledge society 
 
Secondly, besides the actors and processes driving the interactions, also the output 
or type of cooperation emerging, and the forces that can legitimize it, have changed 
and diversified. It used to be carefully negotiated but subsequently relatively stable 
treaties consented to by states − or resolutions issued by international organizations 
(IOs) set up by those same states − on the assumption that state representatives 
most legitimately represent the people. In an increasingly complex society − 
complexity at all levels, political, technological, scientific, regulatory etc. − authority 
flows from other sources too, both public and private46, in particular, expertise or 
knowledge or acceptance by affected stakeholders within or outside the polity that 
enacts a particular norm or regulation.47 In addition, complexity and the resulting 
uncertainty and rapid change that comes with it, requires more flexible norms or 
guidelines, grounded in practical experience and expertise and continuously 
corrected to take account of new developments and learning.48 As Scott observes, in 
the context of financial norms emanating from the Basel Committee, ‘[i]t appears that 
                                                 
43
 According to Susan Schwab (former USTR), for example, “the central question facing 
international economic governance today” is: “What are the relative roles and responsibilities 
of advanced (or developed), emerging, and developing countries”?   Not addressing this 
central question (and the continuing “lumping together of all emerging and developing 
economies”) is, in her view, the core reason for the Doha Round’s failure (Susan Schwab, 
After Doha, Why the Negotiations are Doomed and What We Should do About it, 90 Foreign 
Affairs (2011) 104 at 105 and 111). 
44
 For the possible impact thereof on the evolution of international law and international 
organizations, see inter alia Paulo Borba Casella, BRIC – Brésil, Russie, Inde, Chine et 
Afrique du Sud: à l’heure d’un nouvel ordre juridique international (Paris, Pedone, 2011); 
Stephan Keukeleire and Hans Bruyninckx, The European Union, the BRICs, and the 
Emerging New World Order, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds), International 
Relations and the European Union (OUP, 2008), 380.  
45
 The argument has been made that some of these new powers (e.g. China) have an 
inherent preference for more informal modes of cooperation. To the extent this is correct, the 
stagnation of international law may go hand in hand with the rise of these new powers. See 
Suami, Chapter 2, TOAEP book (“unlike in other regions including Europe, there are fewer 
ordinary international organizations in East Asia”) and Miles Kahler, Legalisation as Strategy: 
The Asia-Pacific Case, in Legalisation and World Politics, 165-167 (Judith L. Goldstein, Miles 
O. Kahler, Robert Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter eds. 2001).  
46
 Harm Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product Standards in the 
Regulation of Integrating Markets, Hart Publishing, 2005. 
47
 Helmut Willke, Smart Governance, Governing the Global Knowledge Society, Campus, 
2007. 
48
 As Willke supra note 36 puts it (at 33), “knowledge and expertise are provisional by 
necessity. They exist to be revised. Even worse, transitions and revisions are not steps in the 
approximation to a final truth but remain provisional steps in a never-ending story”. 
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Basel II may be more like Basel 2.0 (in software language) to be continuously 
updated by later “releases”.’49 
Binding treaties or IO decisions based on one-off and increasingly thin or derivative 
state consent are being replaced or supplemented by practice norms or standards 
based on continuous (and increasingly thick or direct) stakeholder consensus.50 
 
In sum, the societal undercurrents described above – essentially, the emergence of 
an increasingly diverse and complex network/knowledge society − is transforming 
the actors, processes and outputs at work or required to deliver international 
cooperation. The actors (central state authorities), processes (formal lawmaking in 
IOs) and outputs (rigid treaties or IO decisions) recognized in traditional international 
law are not adapted. That is what explains the stagnation of international law.  IN-
LAW or new forms of transnational cooperation are, in most cases, chosen not as 
part of some dark conspiracy to avoid legal constraints or to create an end-run on 
democracy.  In many cases, they develop out of technical necessity51, e.g. because 
the actors involved cannot legally or technically conclude a treaty (be it because of 
limits under domestic or international law) or because a treaty would simply not be 
appropriate to the circumstances, e.g. a rapidly changing field with a lot of 
uncertainty, and a multitude of essential actors beyond central States, where 
adaptable, practice-based norms are needed which require continuous feedback and 
correction in the face of new developments. 
 
c. What’s new? 
 
Many of these developments, considered in isolation, are not particularly new and 
have accrued, with ups and downs, over time. The emergence of new actors (in 
particular, individuals, transnational corporations and civil society) has been 
discussed for decades.  Some are fairly old: an NGO like Anti-Slavery International 
finds its roots in the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society created in 1839, and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was created in 1863.  More 
recently proliferating is the cross-border activity of regulators and administrators part 
of the disaggregated state described above. Similarly, alternative forms of output 
other than treaty or custom, such as standards or guidelines or non-binding 
recommendations of IOs are not new:  the ISO was created in 1947; the ILO with its 
tripartite structure of governments, employers and workers in 1919; non-binding or 
informal gentlemen agreements have been around for ever52, and debates on 
international “soft law” have raged since the 1970s when newly independent states 
sought to instrumentalize, in particular, UN General Assembly resolutions.53 Formal 
international organizations as we know them today (such as the UN, OECD or WTO) 
are actually relatively new and post-date 19th century transnational administrative 
unions, congresses or commissions similar to some of the “new” cooperation forms 
we witness today (think of the International Telegraph Union or the Universal Postal 
                                                 
49 Hal S Scott, International Finance: Transactions, Policy, and Regulation (15
th
 edn 
Foundation Press, New York 2008) 347.  
50
 G. P. Callies and P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of 
Transnational Private Law, Hart Publishing 2010. 
51
 See M. Hartwich, ICANN – Governance by Technical Necessity, in Bogdandy et al, supra 
note 131 131..  
52
 See Jules Basdevant, ‘La conclusion et la redaction des traités et des instruments 
diplomatiques autres que les traités’ (1926) 15 Recueil des Cours V, 539-643 and Pierre 
Michel Eisemann, ‘Le gentlemen’s agreement comme source du droit international’ (1979) 
106 Journal du Droit International, 326-348. 
53
 See, for example, Bruno Simma, Völkerrecht in der Krise, 20 Oesterreichische Zeitschrift 
für Aussenpolitik (1980) 280. 
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Union created in, respectively, 1865 and 1874).54 The stagnation of international law 
goes beyond the individual and separable phenomena of soft law, new centers of 
public and private authority or global administrative law. The network/knowledge 
society described above has accentuated all of these individual currents and is now 
bundling and encapsulating them into one major, new transformation that 
simultaneously propels the importance of IN-LAW and risks bringing traditional 
international law to a halt. The stagnation described here goes beyond the 
phenomenon of soft law as it addresses not only informal output but also new and 
informal actors and processes.  Moreover, even in terms of output, there is nothing 
“soft”, i.e. vague, aspirational or deeply contested (in the sense of UN General 
Assembly resolutions of the 1970s) about most of the internet, medical devices or 
financial norms developed in recent years. If anything, the process of their 
development is highly regulated and strict, based on consensus, and the expectation 
as to compliance with these norms is extremely high (higher than in respect of many 
traditional treaties). What characterizes these finance, medical devices or internet 
norms is not so much that they are non-binding under international law (the hallmark 
of “soft law”) but rather that they are outside traditional international law altogether. 
Similarly, the stagnation of international law described here goes beyond “global 
administrative law”. There is nothing “administrative” about the G-20, after all, a 
meeting of heads of state at the highest political level. Yet, the G-20 and its 
communiqués epitomize the stagnation of traditional international law and 
international organizations.  Nor do we consider that the solution to this stagnation is 
“administrative”.  As discussed below, it goes beyond managerialism and requires 
both politics and courts.  Put differently, the phenomenon described here may 
include but goes beyond both “soft law” and “global administrative law”. 
 
It is, indeed, the combined proliferation of three phenomena − new actors, new 
outputs and new processes − and the concurrent slowdown in traditional 
international law that is new, in particular since the late 1990s. Until recently, for 
example, NGOs (or transnational corporations, for that matter) sought to achieve 
their international regulatory ambitions by acting (mainly) through the state-centric 
system of traditional international law, for example, by pushing (or blocking) certain 
points on the UN or WTO agenda or getting states to agree on a treaty, be it the 
convention against land mines, the Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court 
or the TRIPS agreement. More recently, however, NGOs (and business alike) 
increasingly develop norms outside these confines and steer behaviour more directly 
(and, in many cases, more effectively) through private coalitions or public-private 
partnerships (think of the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, ICANN or the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers). The 1990s 
may represent the apex of formal and legalized international law and organization: 
end of the cold world; reactivation of the UN Security Council; 1992 Rio Conference; 
entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention, creation of the WTO and the 
Energy Charter Treaty in 1994; unlimited extension in time of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty in 1995; 1997 Kyoto Protocol; 1998 ICC Rome Statute.55 The 
turn of the century, in contrast, represents a breaking point.  
                                                 
54
 See Christian Tietje, History of Transnational Administrative Networks, in Transnational 
Administrative Rule-Making, Performance, Legal Effects, and Legitimacy (O. Dilling, M. 
Herberb and G. Winter, eds, 2011), 23-38. 
55
 This flurry of treaty-making and setting up of new international tribunals in the 1990s may 
historically be matched only by the post World War I League of Nations years. Describing this 
period (1919-1940) Grewe (Wilhelm G. Grewe, The Epochs of International Law, Translated 
and revised by Michael Byers, W. de Gruyter, 2000) refers to “a frenzy of law-making” (at 
603), “an exuberance of codification attempts and overflow of norm creation” (at 606) 
concluding that “[i]n no other period of the history of international law have so many attempts 
at codification been undertaken and such a wealth of legal norms been created in such a 
limited space of time. However, the weight of these achievements was inversely related to 
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4. OPTIONS IN RESPONSE: MERGER & ACQUISITION OR ENTRENCHMENT? 
 
Logically speaking, two options present themselves. First, international law can 
adapt and incorporate (at least part) of the new activity described above, thereby 
increasing its societal relevance (merger and acquisition).56 Second, international law 
can entrench itself and stick to its traditional typologies, acknowledging that it is 
increasingly just one form of international cooperation (mainly for states) within a 
broader “legal universe” or “normative menu” of options from which actors can 
choose.57 The second option (entrenchment) must not mean the disappearance of 
international law. In the title of this paper we deliberately use the word stagnation, 
not fall or demise, of international law. Existing treaties, international organizations 
and courts and tribunals will continue to play pivotal roles (be it the UN Security 
Council, the International Criminal Court or the WTO) and new treaties will be 
created, albeit at a slower pace and especially in traditional fields (such as 
extradition or mutual assistance in criminal matters, taxation and trade) or treaties 
where states give rights to individuals (such as human rights or investment treaties). 
Under the second option, the core question would then be how traditional 
international law interacts with other forms or items on the available “normative 
menu”. The first option (merger and acquisition), in contrast, would require a radical 
transformation of international law, both procedurally and substantively. Sudden and 
deliberate change is unlikely. Since the system is largely controlled by states, it is 
unlikely that these same states will formally agree to end their quasi-monopoly and 
accept sources of international law that are completely out of their sphere of 
influence. At the same time, traditional international law is anything but formalistic 
and does allow for organic change to reflect new social realities.58 In terms of actors, 
although states are currently the principal subjects and creators of international law, 
there is no fixed list of subjects of international law that is set in stone.59 Based on 
practice and recognition new subjects and creators of law may and have emerged or 
disappeared (see the next section below).60 In terms of output, there is general 
                                                                                                                                           
their scope and the expense invested in them” (at 606). It is perhaps that latter, qualitative 
aspect that distinguishes the 1990s from the League of Nations period. 
56
 See Paul Schiff Berman A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 Yale J. Int'l L. 301 
(2007) (referring to “multiple normative communities, some of which impose their norms 
through officially sanctioned coercive force and formal legal processes, but many of which do 
not” and adding that “it has become clear that ignoring such normative assertions altogether 
as somehow not “law” is not a useful strategy”). 
57
 For an early realization of this, see Michel Virally, ‘La distinction entre textes internationaux 
de portée juridique et textes internationaux dépourvus de portée juridique (à l’exception des 
textes émanant des organisations internationales)’ (1983/) 60 Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit 
International I, 166-257. 
58
 For evidence of change and creativity at international organizations, see Gabrielle 
Marceau, IGOs in Crisis? Or New Opportunities to Demonstrate Responsibility? 8 
International Organizations Law Review (2011) 1–13. 
59
 See Jean d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, OUP, 2011 at 14. 
For a description of subjects of international law currently accepted, see Walter, ‘Subjects of 
International Law’, Section B.  
60
 See the Reparations case (at 174), where the ICJ held that “throughout its history, the 
development of international law has been influenced by the requirements of international life 
[and that] the progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise 
to instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities which are not States. 
[…] Such new subjects of international law need not necessarily be States or possess the 
rights and obligations of statehood”. See also Hersch Lauterpracht who has pointed out that 
‘it is important…to bear in mind that the range of subjects of international law is not rigidly 
and immutably circumscribed by any definition of the nature of international law but is 
capable of modification and development in accordance with the will of States and the 
requirements of international intercourse.’ (Hersch Lauterpacht, ‛The Subjects of International 
Law’ in E. Lauterpacht (ed.) International Law, The Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, 
Volume I: The General Works (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1970), para. 48. 
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agreement that Article 38 of the ICJ Statute does not offer an exhaustive list of the 
sources of international law61, nor does international law require that a particular 
process be followed to create international norms or that international law can only 
emerge out of particular fora or international organizations. As a result, new sources 
and processes can and have emerged (such as unilateral acts, including decisions 
by international organisations) and even explicitly provided for sources and their law-
ascertainment criteria remain vague62 and can be adapted to new developments.  
The constituent elements of custom and general principals are notoriously vague.  
Even the definition of what is a convention or treaty is contested and open to 
interpretation.63 Hence, even though it is hard to imagine, for example, that the state 
parties to the ICJ Statute amend Article 38 to expand the sources of international 
law, or that the UN Charter be re-written to explicitly allow for new actors, no such 
formal decisions are required for international law to evolve. Vetoes or deadlocks at 
the UN, IMF or WTO are no roadblocks to underlying changes in international law.  
Notwithstanding deadlock on admitting new observers in the WTO, NGOs do not 
require the WTO’s blessing to engage in norm activity on, for example, trade and 
sustainable energy.64 Whether or not states (or IOs) like it, or explicitly allow for it, 
new actors, processes and outputs are and will continue to play an increasing role. 
The first battle ground is more likely to be international courts and tribunals. It is 
there that the line and interaction between traditional international law and new forms 
of cooperation will be tested and contested. Some will undoubtedly close their eyes 
to new developments65, others will engage.66 Yet, also international courts and 
tribunals will be unable to stop change. After all, whether new modes of cooperation 
will have an impact or persist will play out not so much at the UN or WTO, or before 
courts or tribunals, but in foreign ministries, national parliaments and regulatory 
bodies, standard-setting and procurement organizations, corporate board rooms and 
rating agencies, NGO or trade union strategy meetings, the media and individual 
citizen/consumer decisions. Only a fraction of traditional international law is made or 
plays out before courts or tribunals. The same is true all the more for new forms of 
cooperation.  
 
5. BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE MALLEABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
 
To grasp the contours of possible transformation, and how radical it can be (at least 
conceptually), it may be as helpful to look back in time as it is to speculate about the 
future. International lawyers, like many specialists deeply engrossed in their field, 
perceive the present pillars and structure of international law – only states and state 
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 See O. Spierman, International legal argument in the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, CUP, 2005 at 207 (with references to authors and negotiation documents). 
62
 As d’Aspremont supra note 59 at 151 puts it, the “sources of international legal rules do not 
rest on any formal law-ascertainment mechanisms, for these rules are not identified on the 
basis of formal criteria ».  
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 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines “treaty” as “an international 
agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law” 
(Article 2:1(a)). This, of course, begs the question of what an “international agreement” is and 
when such agreement can be said to be “governed by international law”. In addition, the 
Vienna Convention (in Article 3) explicitly acknowledges that there are other international 
agreements part of international law but outside the scope of the Vienna Convention, in 
particular, (i) “international agreements concluded between States and other subjects of 
international law” (whatever these other subjects may be), (ii) international agreements 
“between such other subjects of international law”, and (iii) “international agreements not in 
written form”. See Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International Law, Kluwer, The 
Hague, 1996. 
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 See, for example, the Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement proposed by a coalition of 
countries and NGOs, discussed at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/115745/. 
65
 See infra note 202, Mauritius v. UK arbitration under UNCLOS. 
66
 See infra note 193, WTO panel report on US – Tuna II. 
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consent can create international law; only treaties and custom are sources of 
international law − as firmly established since time immemorial and to be protected 
as written in stone for based on practice and theory elaborated, tested and confirmed 
over centuries.  
 
In the field of international law, as in many other fields, nothing could be further from 
the truth. The very term “international law” was introduced as recently as 1789 by 
Jeremy Bentham.67 Among continental European scholars the term “European law of 
nations” (Europäisches Völkerrecht), not “international law”, was used until the 1880s 
(telling us something about the then recognized actors of international law, that is, 
essentially European states).68 Indeed, it is generally accepted that modern 
international law or post-classical international law, as we know it today, began to 
evolve in 1919, that is, less than a century ago.69 So what may seem firmly 
embedded today and unimaginable to change any time in the future, is actually of 
pretty recent vintage.  
 
It suffices to read history to realize that an international legal order – or what we 
referred to above as “legal universe” or “normative menu” − can also present itself 
differently and radically evolve over time including at the three core levels of actors, 
forms and processes identified earlier.  Making abstraction of the concept of states, 
there are, indeed, only two minimum prerequisites for an international legal order to 
exist: (i) a set of relatively independent actors, not subject to a superimposed power 
which are, nonetheless, (ii) linked in their relationships through norms which are 
accepted as constraining behavior.  Within this raw bones framework of relatively 
independent actors related through norms, an endless constellation and combination 
or variety of actors and normative outputs and processes can be thought of. This is 
the kind of out-of-the-box thinking or framework that we will need to address the 
stagnation of international law.70 The international legal order is far more malleable 
than conventionally understood. 
 
The historical dimension deserves some elaboration.71  In the Middle Ages72, the 
main actors or members of the international legal order were not states (they did, 
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 Jeremy Bentham, Principals of International Law, 1789. 
68
 Grewe, supra note 55, at 464. 
69
 Grewe, supra note 55, at 575. 
70
 As Willke supra note 36 at 17 put it, “globalization is confronting the nation states not just 
with a set of problems which defy the limits of national territories but which also defy the limits 
of law as a mode of governance and regulation”. 
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of actors, processes and output at play in the past, without taking position on the accuracy of 
his specific legal positions or sub-division into six epochs.  When Grewe divides and 
describes the different epochs or transformations that have occurred in the international legal 
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actors of the international legal community. Third, the organization or “constitutional 
development” of the community (“how is the creation of law provided for, from which sources 
is the law seen to flow, and which organs are entrusted with its codification into positive legal 
rules”, ibid. at 31). By merely asking these questions of delimitation, membership and 
organization Grewe answers the challenge of whether it is possible to imagine an 
international legal order with actors, processes and outputs that are different from traditional 
international law or traditional international organizations. The answer is yes, both historically 
and conceptually. 
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obviously, not yet exist), but the spiritual and temporal regime of the two universal 
powers, the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope.73 Both empire and papacy had 
some form of superimposing authority, not completely unlike today’s international 
organizations or more informal transnational networks. Underneath, however, were 
other actors such as kings, princes and an even longer list of dukes and other 
nobles, all of which were “autonomous communities capable of engaging in legal 
relations with one another”74 and tied up in complex feudal relationships.  The variety 
of actors, including transnational ones, goes further: “In addition to the chivalry, the 
ministry, from the clergy to the orders of priesthood, formed a tightly knit cohesive 
supranational element. The same is true, albeit to a lesser degree, of the medieval 
urban world of dependent and independent cities”.75 At their height, the urban 
Hanseatic leagues were, indeed, independent subjects of international law with the 
power to conclude treaties.76 It requires only a small stretch of the imagination to 
make the link between this complex international legal order of the Middle Ages and 
the above described society of networks and crossing of the lines between public 
and private authority, national and international law. 
 
During the Spanish age (1494-1648), other actors emerge, including states. Grewe 
points out, however, that in this period “States as such did not regularly enter into 
treaty relations … sovereigns entered into treaties in their personal capacity. In 
numerous treaties it was expressly provided that the treaty would terminate with the 
death of one sovereign”.77 In addition, “States at this age were not yet as closed and 
impermeable as the developed modern States. This was reflected by the fact that not 
only did sovereigns [emperors or kings] appear as subjects of international treaty 
relations, but so did other internal public authorities [princes and cities of their realm], 
who entered into their own treaties with foreign powers, or who took part in the 
treaties entered into between sovereigns”.78 Here, the analogy with today’s 
disaggregated or administrative state described earlier is not far away.  
 
In the subsequent French age (1648-1815), what catches attention is “the specific, 
semi-State, semi-private intermediate position that the [colonial Dutch and English] 
trading companies asserted”.79 These companies were “joint-stock companies” 
based on private capital but also “chartered companies” operating on the basis of 
concessions and privileges granted to them by States including trade monopolies 
and sovereign rights. Grewe notes that “[i]t was a matter of controversy in 
international legal theory during the nineteenth century whether the great trading 
companies were ‘subjects’ of international law, whether they held a ‘sovereignty’ of 
their own, or whether they were merely ‘organs’ of their parent country”.80  The status 
of these 16th-18th century trading companies is, no doubt, somewhat reminiscent of 
21st century transnational corporations and the many public-private partnerships 
developing today. 
 
The international legal order has developed alongside changing forms of social 
organizations, from the Greek city-states and the jus gentium of the Romans to the 
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 Grewe, supra note 55, identifies six epochs: (i) the Middle ages (fifth to fifteenth century), 
(ii) the Spanish age (1494-1648), (iii) the French age (1648-1815), (iv) the British age (1815-
1919), (v) the League of Nations (1919-1944), (vi) the United Nations (1945-1989). 
73
 Grewe, supra note 55, at 11. 
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empire of medieval Christendom and the modern territorial state.81 Why should and 
could it not adapt to a new knowledge society of networks?  
 
6. KEEPING THE NEW AND THE OLD ACCOUNTABLE 
 
Should we be worried about the legitimacy or democratic accountability of these new 
types of cooperation? A number of conventional views must be challenged.  
 
a. All cooperation that affects freedom – binding or not − must be justified 
 
Firstly, it is not because something is not legally binding under international law that 
it does not affect public policy-making or individual freedom. Soft law or informal 
modes of cooperation with new actors and/or pursuant to novel processes may be as 
constraining – if not more so – than traditional treaties.82 Especially at the 
international level where centralized enforcement is absent, actors comply for 
reasons other than or beyond legal constraint (e.g. reputation, reciprocity, retaliation, 
prior consent to or perceived legitimacy of the norm in the first place83). These 
reasons may be activated as much for binding, traditional international law as they 
can be triggered by new forms of cooperation.84  Hence, for the Case Act in the 
United States to only require notification to the US Congress of agreements 
concluded by the United States that are “legally binding” does not make sense.85 
Assuming that the objective of the Case Act is to keep the US Congress informed 
about international cooperation that matters, i.e., that may constrain the United 
States or impact US agencies or citizens, there are legally binding international 
agreements that have remained dead letter86, as much as there are non-binding 
agreements or standards that have impacted US citizens directly (think of the Basel 
accords or ISO standards). In other words, the US Congress – and other parliaments 
for that matter87 − ought to be informed and be given a minimum of oversight (albeit 
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 See, for example, Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Historical Types of International Law, Bibliotheca 
Visseriana, 1923, quoted in Grewe, supra note 55, at 1.  
82
 In respect of ICH standards, see Berman, Chapter 10, TOAEP book (“ The ICH guidelines 
are considered voluntary, but they have all been implemented in the three ICH regions. 
Members will typically adopt the ICH guidelines as domestic (legally non-binding) guidance 
documents or guidelines”). 
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 See R. Howse and R. Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really 
Matters 1 Global Policy (2010) 127-136 and Thomas Franck, Legitimacy in the International 
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from rule to rule and time to time”). 
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 See Chris Brummer, Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Order Without 
Law: The Power of Soft Law in Global Governance, 2011. 
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not binding under international law’. See U.S. State Department website, Circular 175 
Procedure, at http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/c175/. Hence, if a document is not legally binding 
(ie, not an international agreement under the specific criteria of Circular 175), the obligations 
in Circular 175 do not apply. 
86
 See as early as Oscar Schachter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. 
INT'L L. 300 (1968), at 311 ("some 'laws,' though enacted properly, have so low a degree of 
probable compliance that they are treated as 'dead letters' and … some treaties, while 
properly concluded, are considered 'scraps of paper'”). 
87
 In the UK, for example, the formalities which surround treaty-making do not apply to so-
called Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) - which the UK defines as international 
commitments that are not legally binding. As a result, MOUs are not usually published in the 
UK. See Treaties and MOUs, Guidance on Practice and Procedures, 2004, Treaty Section, 
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, p. 1. Note, however, that the UN Treaty Handbook (p. 61) 
does consider MOUs as legally binding: ‘The term memorandum of understanding (MOU) is 
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indirectly through administrative agencies) in respect of all international cooperation 
that affects public policy-making and individual freedom.88 Whether an instrument is 
“legally binding” under international law is simply no longer the right criterion or 
proxy. To the extent new forms of cooperation matter or have an impact, they must 
be justified (where they fail or have no impact, we can learn from their mistakes; yet, 
justification or legitimacy is then of little or no concern).89  
 
b. Cooperation outside state consent can be legitimate 
 
Secondly, as traditional international law is based on state consent, we might 
presume (at least in the context of democracies, more on this below) that it is 
legitimate and democratically accountable on the view that state representatives 
speak for, and are controlled by, the people. Yet, legitimacy can come from other 
sources too, in particular, expertise, an inclusive and open process of deliberation or 
the implementation of effective outcomes.90 Experts and private bodies can create 
legitimate norms.91 In the United States, for example, for reasons of cost, expertise 
and effectiveness, it is a long-standing policy that standard-setting be done in private 
bodies, not government agencies.92 At the same time, the participation of federal 
agencies in standard-setting activities outside the government is encouraged. Most 
rule-addressees would probably rather have experts and a variety of stakeholders 
set safety or banking standards in a deliberative process, tested and updated based 
on the latest empirical evidence and checked only at arms length by politics (e.g. for 
due process, conflicts of interest and general guidelines), than national politicians.93 
Traditional international law, based as it is on state consent, does not have a 
                                                                                                                                           
often used to denote a less formal international instrument than a typical treaty or 
international agreement … The United Nations considers MOUs to be binding and registers 
them if submitted by a party or if the United Nations is a party.’ 
88
 Joost Pauwelyn and George Pavlakos, Principled Monism and The Normative 
Conception of Coercion under International Law, in Beyond the Established Orders: Policy 
Interconnections Between the EU and the Rest of the World (eds. Malcolm Evans & Panos 
Koutrakos, 2011). See also Flückiger, Chapter 19, OUP book (“the validity of restrictions 
[imposed through informal or soft law] to these fundamental rights [of individuals] must be 
judged based on the same criteria as those applied to legal [hard law] restrictions, which 
means that they are subject to the requirements of legal basis, public interest and 
proportionality”).  
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 Note, indeed, that certain IOs already require that even non-binding recommendations be 
submitted to domestic parliaments for adoption. See Art. 19:6 ILO Constitution; Art. IV:B(4) 
UNESCO Constitution; Art. XI FAO ; Ch. XIV, Art. 62 WHO.  
90
 M. Barnet and M. Finnemore, Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London 2004) 24. In European affairs, scholars 
have widely adopted the conceptual distinction between input- and output-related dimensions 
of democratic legitimacy, as developed by Fritz W. Sharpf in his book Governing in Europe: 
Effective and Democratic? Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, chapter 1.  
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 Case studies bear out that effectiveness and legitimacy are enhanced further by 
strengthening the interaction between multilateral and private forms of governance in ways 
that complement and reinforce each other: see, e.g., Axel Marx, Emilie Bécault and Jan 
Wouters, ‘Private standards in forestry: assessing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
Forest Stewardship Council’, in Axel Marx, Johan Swinnen, Miet Maertens and Jan Wouters 
(eds.), Private Standards and Global Governance. Economic, Legal and Political 
Perspectives, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012, 60, at 91.  
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 See OMB Circular A-119 Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary 
Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, available at 
http://standards.gov/a119.cfm (directing agencies to use ‘voluntary consensus standards’ in 
lieu of ‘government-unique standards’ with a view to reduce to a minimum the reliance by 
agencies on government-unique standards, referring to justifications of cost to the 
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 See Jaffe supra note 122 at 363 (“Where not only technical skill but continuous judgment is 
demanded the legislature is helpless”); Willke supra note 36 at 7. 
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monopoly on legitimate cooperation. New types of cooperation require new types of 
accountability, and special attention.94 Yet, conceptually, there is no reason why only 
traditional international law could qualify as legitimate or democratically 
accountable.95  
 
c. State consent is not (longer) a sufficient condition for legitimate cooperation  
 
Thirdly, the idea (referred to earlier) that traditional international law is necessarily 
legitimate and democratically accountable, because it is based on state consent, can 
no longer be accepted blindly (if ever it could).96 At the international level, the formal 
legitimacy that comes with a treaty or being part of international law is extremely thin. 
For treaties, all that is required is an agreement consented to by states.97 
International law is agnostic on how this agreement was reached (process), who 
participated in its establishment (actors), what form it takes (instrument) and what is 
actually agreed on (substance98). The stop-clause of state consent − hereafter 
referred to as “thin state consent” − is all that is required to justify international law. A 
norm is part of international law not because it is right or reasonable but because 
states agreed to it (auctoritas, non veritas facit legem99). An agreement between two 
unelected heads of state recorded in informal but mutually accepted minutes, 
concluded after a five minute discussion in some secret, smoke-filled backroom is as 
much a “treaty” binding under international law as a formal convention between two 
states concluded after five years of multi-stakeholder dialogues under the auspices 
of the UN that was formally ratified by the democratically elected parliaments of both 
State parties.  
 
d.  Do new forms of cooperation circumvent international law formalities? 
 
In the context of these thin validation requirements of traditional international law, the 
charge that new forms of cooperation circumvent the formal strictures of international 
law or are “devoid of the guarantees that come with law”100 rings rather hollow. What 
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 See Schepel supra note 46 at 413-4 (“As long as we keep our constitutional aspirations 
and our legal imagination locked in the unity of law and state, we will not only fail to 
understand the phenomenon of global law conceptually but also fail normatively to grasp the 
opportunities to enhance its legitimacy”); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global 
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Accountability in Modern Democracies, Palgrave, 2003, at 1). 
96
 See Steven Wheatley, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Law, Hart Publishing, 
2010; S. Besson, Theorizing the Sources of International Law, in S. Besson and J. Tasioulas 
(eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, OUP, Oxford, 2010, 163 at 166 and 175 (consent 
is insufficient to ensure the authority and legitimacy of international legal rules).  
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 See Klabbers, Chapter 10, OUP book (“ in international law, considerations of pure form 
are hardly deemed relevant: there are no formal requirements attached to the making of 
international law, as long as there is substantive agreement between relevant parties”). 
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 With the possible exception of rules of jus cogens which, in theory, invalidate any 
conflicting treaty. 
99
 Hobbes, Leviathan, Vol. 2, ch. 26 (“authority not truth makes law”). 
100
 Klabbers, supra note 35 at 79. 
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are these guarantees that come with international law? What are the strictures of 
formal international lawmaking that these new forms of cooperation circumvent? 
Other than state consent, there are none. In contrast to this thin consent, the 
emerging code of good practice for the development of standards or new forms of 
cooperation outside international law is normatively thicker.101 In many (though not 
all), the process is more inclusive, transparent and predictable. The actors involved 
are more diverse and expert. The output, finally, is elaborated more carefully and 
coherently, supported by a broader consensus (both ex ante when the norm is 
developed, and ex post when the norm is accepted because it works) and 
continuously questioned and adapted to practical, real world developments and 
needs102 (the so-called “rough consensus and running code” 103, without veto or 
opting-out power for any given actor, contrary to traditional international law104). 
Whereas traditional international law is driven by thin (state) consent, new forms of 
cooperation are increasingly based on thick (stakeholder) consensus. 105 
 
e. Do new forms of cooperation circumvent domestic law formalities? 
 
The circumvention of domestic formalities linked to lawmaking must be taken more 
seriously. Domestic accountability mechanisms are at the core of keeping new 
models of international cooperation in check.106 In most countries, for a treaty to 
become binding it must receive the consent by Parliament or Congress. Certain new 
forms of cooperation may avoid this legitimizing step.107 For example, few, if any, 
national parliaments have explicitly consented to the Wassenaar Arrangement, 
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 See Verdier, Chapter 21, OUP book, based on a case study of Basel II and its 
implementation in the United States, concluding that “domestic law and politics substantially 
constrain the autonomy of national regulators engaged in [informal international lawmaking]”. 
In support: Cassini, Chapter 18, OUP book and Berman, Chapter 22, OUP book. 
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52 of the Constitution), concluded by the French President and subject to “ratification”, and 
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Foreign Affairs and subject to “approbation” (Circulaire du 30 mai 1997 relative à l’élaboration 
et à la conclusion des accords internationaux). See C. Chayet, Les accords en forme 
simplifiée (1957) 3 AFDI 205-26, J. Salmon, Les accords non formalizes ou ‘solo consensu’ 
(1999) AFDI 1-28. 
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although for EU states its substance was implemented in an EU Regulation 
(controlled, once again, by governments, not parliaments).  In Latin America, a 
debate is raging as to whether stand-by arrangements concluded between the IMF 
and countries seeking financial assistance from the IMF -- generally regarded as not 
being international agreements -- should nonetheless satisfy the legal domestic 
approval requirements for the conclusion of a treaty.108  The conditionalities set out in 
such IMF arrangements can have enormous consequences.  Yet, in most cases, 
they have been adopted without parliamentary approval.  In Canada, Basel II was 
implemented through guidelines rather than a regulation, partly to avoid the 
procedural requirements associated with adopting regulations.109 In the United 
States some have criticized as unconstitutional the trend of concluding so-called 
'congressional-executive agreements' (adopted by simple majority in both houses of 
the US Congress) rather than treaties which, under Article II:2 of the US Constitution, 
require the advice and consent of two-thirds of the US Senate.110 
Of course, the domestic approval of treaties is often a mere rubber-stamping of a fait 
accompli anyhow.111 Yet, to secure domestic democratic legitimacy112, a minimum 
degree of parliamentary or congressional oversight (not necessarily formal consent) 
of all international cooperation that affects public policy-making or individual freedom 
– treaty or not − must be available. To the extent lawmaking powers are delegated to 
administrative agencies, transparency, reason-giving and notice and comment 
procedures should apply to both the domestic and international activities and norm-
making of these agencies, whether norms are binding under international law or not. 
A general guideline along these lines is already in place in Canada.113 Requirements 
under domestic administrative law of one (important) member may then de facto also 
apply to the operation of the entire international network. When it comes to private 
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standards or norms, competition law may play a controlling role.114 Finally, judicial 
review must be available before domestic courts to protect fundamental rights of 
individuals and to ensure checks and balances between the legislature, executive 
and administrative agencies. Examples of such court control can be found in the 
EU115, The Netherlands116, United States117, Canada118 and Brazil.119 Also 
international courts and tribunals can play a controlling role (more on this below).120 It 
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is not that traditional international law is legitimate and new forms of cooperation are 
not, or vice versa. Both require close scrutiny and vigilance.121 Both can be more, or 
less, democratically legitimate depending on the circumstances.122  
 
f. A calibrated approach to accountability 
 
A one-size fit all model of accountability123 such as Parliamentary approval no longer 
works.124 As Krisch remarks, “[w]e have arrived at a point where political and 
functional needs bar a return to the old order of international law in which difference 
was processed through consent-based law-making and strictly domestic 
mechanisms of implementation”.125  Depending on the subject matter (e.g. fighting 
inflation or setting food standards versus trade policy or peace and security) and 
impact of the norms (e.g. purely local or global), an appropriate division of labour 
must be worked out between experts, politicians and courts, the international, 
regional and national level, public officials and the private sector, congress, the 
executive and administrative agencies, formal and informal law. In each case, an 
appropriate balance must be found between effectiveness (and the independence of 
action this might require) and accountability (and the control or oversight that comes 
with it). Crucially, independence of action (e.g. decision-making by experts) must not 
mean “agencies on the loose”. Independence in day-to-day activity (e.g. little, if any, 
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ongoing control by politicians over, for example, interest rate setting by central banks 
or scientific decisions taken by food safety agencies) can, and must, be 
compensated by ex ante controls (such as setting a clear mandate or benchmark 
against which actors can be held accountable; guidelines; appointments; or rules on 
conflicts of interest) and ex post controls (such as re-adjustment of guidelines, 
financial accountability or complaints mechanisms). A requirement that each and 
every government regulation or guideline be approved by Congress126 would err on 
the side of accountability (in the EU context referred to as accountability 
“overload”127; in an ICANN study labeled “multiple accountabilities disorder 
(MAD)”128) and make effective, high quality norm-setting practically impossible. 
Conversely, regulating through purely informal guidelines or expert reports 
developed without publicity, reason-giving or public interest oversight would err on 
the side of effectiveness and undermine the fundamental idea of rule by the people. 
Moreover, the first extreme (accountability overload) would, in the longer term, also 
turn unaccountable, as regulators would find under-ground ways to avoid scrutiny 
(formalization of rule-making, in a type of cat and mouse game, always creates the 
next level of informal rule-making). Similarly, the second extreme (no oversight) 
would, in the longer term, also turn ineffective as neutrality, quality and trust in the 
norms created is likely to wane and with it their legitimacy and effectiveness. 
Although a balance must be found between the two, ultimately, effectiveness and 
accountability go hand in hand.  
 
g. New forms of cooperation as first-best, normatively superior solution? 
 
In the end of the day, what does it add to conclude a legally binding treaty, rather 
than a scheme or accord outside international law? Not legitimacy, nor effectiveness 
(at least not per se). Legitimacy depends on many factors beyond being or not being 
part of international law (such as process, inclusion of all stakeholders or domestic 
input and ratification).  In some countries a formal treaty may trigger effective 
domestic oversight mechanisms.  In many other countries, however, treaties 
automatically enter the domestic legal system without much internal scrutiny and are, 
at times, even superior to domestic law, thereby raising questions of legitimacy 
rather than alleviating them. To the extent treaties require a one-size fit-all hard law 
implementation, they disable the domestic flexibility that comes with many new types 
of cooperation. This can make treaties less (rather than more) accountable as 
compared to other international norms that can be adjusted to domestic needs and 
sensitivities through domestic implementation and scrutiny. Moreover, the rigidity of 
treaties once adopted (amendment normally requires unanimity and a new, formal 
round of Parliamentary approvals) makes them less (rather than more) democratic. 
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As Krisch points out, “[r]evisability is commonly seen as a key element of democratic 
orders … Ensuring the revisability of norms and decisions then becomes a key 
democratic demand and pluralism’s legal and institutional openness facilitates it”.129 
 
Effectiveness, in the absence of centralized coercion or enforcement, does not 
automatically come with being part of international law either.130  It depends on the 
specific monitoring or enforcement scheme in place, which could be weak under 
international law, as is for example the case for UNESCO or ILO commitments, and 
could be strong outside international law, e.g. the OECD’s Financial Action Task 
Force or the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, both backed-up with 
effective sanctions.131 
 
No inherent or automatic benefits come with being part of international law.132 Yet, to 
conclude a treaty, in particular a multilateral one within a formal IO, requires huge 
transaction costs and once concluded is hard to adapt to changing circumstances.  
Whatever the legitimacy that comes with traditional international law (at the 
international level, relatively little) can be compensated both internationally (thick 
consensus instead of thin consent) and at home (parliamentary/congressional 
oversight; administrative notice and comment procedures; judicial review; other 
checks and balances). Indeed, in the end, new forms of cooperation can be more 
(rather than less) accountable or responsive to a broader audience and better (rather 
than worse) adapted to the needs of modern society. To that extent, traditional 
international law is no longer the first-best option to which soft or informal law can 
only aspire.  
 
7. POWER AND EXTERNALITIES OR HOW TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF ALL AFFECTED PARTIES 
 
a. Power remains asymmetric but is increasingly dispersed 
 
Do new, often informal modes of cooperation enhance the risk that powerful actors 
take control or game the system to their advantage?133 Does traditional international 
law not better protect the weak, by imposing equal rules for all (right rather than 
might)? There is no denying that in a diverse and complex network/knowledge 
                                                 
129
 Krisch, supra note 125, at 273. 
130
 See Franck supra note 83 at 711 (“In place of coercion, there is only the claim to 
compliance, based on social entitlement, which a legitimate rule makes on, and on behalf of, 
all members of the community … The legitimacy of a rule, or of a rule-making or rule-applying 
institution, is a function of the perception of those in the community concerned that the rule, 
or the institution, has come into being endowed with legitimacy: that is, in accordance with 
right process”). 
131 See Jürgen Friedrich, ‘Legal Challenges of Non-binding Instruments: The Case of the 
FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’ in A. von Bogdandy, R. Wolfrum, J. Von 
Bernsdorff, Ph. Dann and M. Goldmann (Eds.), The Excercise of Public Authority by 
International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional Law, Heidelberg: Springer, 
2010, at 511 
132
 Yet, as noted earlier, we of course acknowledge that sometimes States continue to have 
an interest, and good reasons, to tie their counterparts into a binding bilateral or multilateral 
treaty scheme (think of disarmament treaties like the ABM Treaty during the Cold War, or 
multilateral environmental treaties like the Kyoto Protocol which do not tolerate reservations 
in order to preserve the integrity of the greenhouse emission reduction scheme). 
133
 See Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Coalitions of the Willing’ and the Evolution of Informal International 
Law in Coalitions of the Willing - Avantgarde or Threat? 1 (C. Calliess, C. Nolte, G. Stoll, 
eds., 2008). See also Klabbers, Chapter 10, OUP book (“IN-LAW is effective for the powers 
that be, leaving disadvantaged groups little emancipatory possibilities”). 
 27  
society, power continues to play a role.134 Staying on top of activity and information 
becomes increasingly difficult, especially for weak actors (e.g. small, resource-
starved least-developed countries or interest groups that are difficult to organize). 
The availability of a more diverse “normative menu” of options or forms in which 
states can cooperate, may also enhance strategic decisions in the choice between 
formal and informal cooperation, soft and hard law. 135 However, forum shopping has 
always existed also amongst formal IOs or between traditional sources.136 New 
forms of cross-border cooperation will not neutralize power differences, although the 
emergence of new actors, both states and non-state entities, implies a more 
competitive environment where power is increasingly dispersed and mutually 
checked.137 Countries like China and Brazil contest and check US power – in fact, 
they do this increasingly together with their BRICS partners.138 Transnational NGO, 
business and consumer networks, in turn, exert pressure on state powers. Even 
within states, internationally active regulators, agencies or judges, enter power plays 
and thereby impose certain checks and balances. Willke refers to a shift from power-
based to knowledge-based decision-making, the emergence of lateral world systems 
and a concomitant “shift from a normative to a cognitive mode of decision-
making”.139 In addition, interactions between networks of cooperation, formal or 
informal, can provide further checks and balances, and thereby enhance both 
accountability and effectiveness. Krisch rightly describes “the interplay of different 
layers of law in a pluralist order as an accountability mechanism”.140  Pluralism is not 
just about competition, but also about addressing complexity through individual 
ingenuity which combined offers solutions which no single actor could have 
constructed (the whole is mightier than the sum of its parts).141  
   
And, obviously, also traditional international law is not devoid of power politics, 
notwithstanding the legal fiction of sovereign equality.142 Once more, it is less 
relevant whether the cooperation is legally binding or not, new or traditional. More 
relevant is whether it is bilateral or multilateral, symmetrical or asymmetrical, whether 
all affected stakeholders are involved or not, whether the process is inclusive, 
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transparent and based on facts rather than secret and driven by strategic power 
plays. Both extremes happen in traditional international law and in new forms of 
cooperation.  
 
b. Keeping Cooperation Accountable Toward All Affected Parties  
 
Probably the core challenge for new forms of cooperation is their taking into account 
of external stakeholder interests.143 Coalitions of the willing may be created. Yet, 
these may also affect (directly or indirectly) outsider state or private actors (think of 
the ICH, Basel or the FATF). Such coalitions may more efficiently address collective 
action problems or more accurately and efficiently tackle a problem (e.g. harmonized 
certification requirements for the approval of pharmaceuticals at the ICH, involving 
only the USA, EU and Japan as the leading market players). Yet, the impact of these 
coalitions often extends, de jure or de facto, positively or negatively144, beyond their 
membership. In the case of the ICH, for example, countries like Brazil or China are 
pressed to de facto adopt ICH standards although these standards have been 
written without their input.145 In the context of Basel financial standards, Claessens 
has argued that Basel II was shaped by banks and regulators from industrialized 
countries and is not responsive to the needs and circumstances of developing 
countries.146 The ICH has been criticized for including the pharmaceutical industry as 
an equal participant with regulators but excluding patient or consumer organizations. 
Basel has been blamed for being responsive to large banks, but not or less so to 
smaller financial institutions or users. The Forest Stewardship Council, which for 20 
years provides a unique system of transnational private regulation for the 
preservation of forests, has been facing a North-South divide both in terms of formal 
representation/participation as well as in relation to certificate adoption.147 
GLOBALG.A.P., the world’s most extensive system of private food safety standards, 
faces a similar challenge of inclusion of consumers and small food producers.148 
 
On the one hand, this type of transnational cooperation is a step forward as 
compared to, say, the US or a US agency unilaterally setting standards and 
imposing them on the rest of the world (in the ICH, at least EU and Japanese 
interests are taken on board).149 On the other hand, the legitimacy of certain 
transnational cooperation still leaves to be desired as its accountability mechanisms 
are not commensurate with its real life impact. ICH guidance on good clinical 
practices (GCPs), for example, allows the pharmaceutical industry to run clinical 
trials in which the patients in the control group can be treated with placebos instead 
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of the existing proven therapy. Often such clinical trials are conducted in developing 
countries, to lower costs. Using placebos there, instead of existing treatments, has 
led to patients dying who could have been saved by using existing proven therapy.150 
Had developing countries been involved in the establishment of these GCPs such 
adverse consequences might have been avoided.151  Although the Kimberley 
Scheme on conflict diamonds involves both the diamond industry and NGOs, critics 
have pointed out that the interests of small, artisanal diamond miners (who may have 
a much harder time complying with Kimberley rules than big mining corporations 
such as De Beers) were not represented.152 Similar critiques have been raised in 
respect of internet standards, arguing that recent changes in the internet’s 
architecture deviate from the internet’s original design principles and benefit network 
providers at the expense of internet users, application developers and content 
providers.153  As Mulgan explains, “[a]ccountability forces members of the 
government into dialogue with their citizens … A second justification for 
accountability involves the principle that those whose rights or interests are 
adversely affected by the actions of someone else have a right to hold that person to 
account”.154  
 
Increased participation of external stakeholders is, therefore, a hallmark of recent 
reforms be it at the Basel Committee155 or the ICH.156  In June 2012, for example, the 
ICH adopted a major overhaul of its principles of governance (inter alia, to ensure 
“regulatory oversight as well as integrity of the entire process”), removing the veto 
power and equal participation rights of the pharmaceutical industry, increasing 
transparency through publication of technical documents and enhancing global 
outreach by involving new countries and regional harmonization initiatives.157 
Examining Brazil in the context of a number of transnational cooperation schemes, 
Nasser and Machado conclude that “[w]here Brazil had until recently no voice in the 
outputs of the networks, it begins to be heard. Where it had already one, it is now 
more audible”.158 Assessing the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, 
Corredig concludes that “[i]f anything, the transparency of the decision-making 
process at the international level in the context of [disaster risk reduction] often 
appears to be superior to the transparency of the mechanisms successively adopted 
at the national level”.159 
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Domestically, accountability mechanisms must be strengthened so as to legitimize 
norms towards, in particular, internal stakeholders.  Think of congressional oversight, 
application of notice and comment procedures or judicial review discussed above.160 
Internationally, accountability mechanisms must be set up to make sure that norms 
agreed to take account of all affected interests including external stakeholders:  In 
the ICH, for example, by involving consumer or patient organizations on top of 
pharmaceutical companies as well as by giving voice and input to affected states 
beyond the USA, EU and Japan; At the Basel Committee, by involving stakeholders 
other than large international banks and industry associations as well as emerging 
economies. Such international mechanisms may include complaints or ombudsman-
type mechanisms such as the Inspection Panel set up at the World Bank. The use of 
domestic procedures (such as US notice and comments procedures which are 
generally open to foreigners) may also be a tool for external stakeholders to voice 
concerns.161 As Verdier points out, “accountability mechanisms at the international 
level should be designed to address gaps that are not addressed by the domestic 
process, rather than to duplicate it”.162  
 
c. Creating the best of both worlds? Thick stakeholder consensus rather than 
thin state consent 
 
This way, the best of both worlds could emerge: norms that are domestically 
grounded and accepted, while at the same time avoid imposing externalities on 
outsiders.163 The informal nature and flexibility of new forms of cooperation (be it the 
ICH or the G-20) allows for this adaptation to take account of new interests much 
more so than, for example, in the UN or WTO where institutional reforms are 
excruciatingly difficult because of state consent.164 At that level as well, new forms of 
cooperation can offer the best of both worlds: normatively superior cooperation (thick 
consensus as opposed to thin consent, discussed earlier), while at the same time 
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addressing (at least some of) the collective action problems that a system based on 
state consent cannot tackle.165  
The reality is, indeed, that the requirement of state consent, prevailing in traditional 
international law, is both too lenient and too strict. Too lenient or easy, because the 
validation rules of international law, discussed earlier, do not care about 
transparency, inclusiveness or impartiality of the process or actors involved, nor 
about the effectiveness, coherence or substantive/constitutional quality of what is 
agreed on. Too strict or difficult, because concluding rules on, for example, climate 
change or the WTO’s Doha round requires individual consent of each state involved. 
That thick consensus, as we know it in the standards world, can be procedurally and 
substantively superior was discussed above. At the same time, it can also address 
certain collective action problems. Where thin state “consent” implies a veto or opt-
out power for each individual state, “consensus”, as it is defined in the standards 
world, provides for a procedurally inclusive and fair process but at the end of the day 
takes away individual veto power. The ISO/IEC Guide 2, for example, defines 
“consensus” as follows: 
 
[g]eneral agreement, characterized by the absence of sustained opposition to 
substantial issues by any important part of the concerned interests and by a process 
that involves seeking to take into account the views of all parties concerned and to 
reconcile any conflicting arguments. 
   
In other words, the views of all parties concerned must be taken into account and an 
attempt must be made to reconcile conflicting arguments. Yet, once “general 
agreement” is reached, that is, there is no “sustained opposition” to “substantial” 
issues by an “important” part of the concerned interests, the norm or standard can be 
adopted to address the problem identified.    
  
In sum, when looking for global public goods (be it progress on climate change or 
sustainable development) it may, therefore, be better to focus on these new forms of 
cooperation involving a variety of actors instead of striving toward state-centered 
supra-national authorities or IOs with collective and formally delegated powers that 
can constrain or coerce individual states.166 If carefully designed and kept in check, 
these new forms can be both domestically grounded and accepted (through internal 
accountability mechanisms such as administrative notice and comment procedures, 
congressional oversight and judicial review) and take account of transnational 
externalities (if the transnational network is sufficiently open to external 
stakeholders). They can be both procedurally inclusive and substantively coherent, 
and overcome collective action problems (thick consensus rather than thin 
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consent).167 This is a far cry away, even the anti-thesis of, conventional critiques 
against new types of international cooperation.168  
 
Problem-solving in an increasingly diverse and complex network/knowledge society 
will require action beyond what states can shoulder. It needs pragmatic deliberation 
involving multiple sources of knowledge, experience and control; not uni-dimensional 
involvement of increasingly detached and under-resourced diplomats paralyzed by 
geopolitical power plays, hidden value systems or zero-sum distributional 
calculations. The absence of centralized lawmaking in international law has its 
problems and can make collective action more difficult. At the same time, the de-
centralized, heterarchical nature of the international system, where new processes, 
actors and forms of cooperation can emerge almost organically, also has 
advantages as compared to more monolithic, State-centered national legal 
systems.169 This decentralized activity and control with distributed problem solving 
and multiple actors and interactions at a diversity of levels can ultimately make the 
international legal system more (rather than less) adaptable to the challenges of the 
network/knowledge society described earlier.  
 
8. THE THRESHOLD OF TRADITIONAL INTERNATIONAL LAW VERSUS THE EMERGENCE OF 
PROCEDURAL META-NORMS FOR ANY RESTRICTION ON FREEDOM 
 
a. The threshold for a norm to be part of traditional international law 
 
In the short to medium term, do any of the new or informal types of cooperation 
described above amount to international law, traditionally defined?170 As discussed 
earlier, traditional international law is anything but formalistic. Informal instruments 
(such as oral agreements or custom) can bind; non-binding instruments (such as 
ISO standards) can be very formal.  For there to be a treaty in the sense of the 
Vienna Convention all that is required is an agreement consented to by states.171 Jan 
Klabbers, for example, has demonstrated that international courts and tribunals have 
commonly referred to and applied as part of international law press communiqués 
and informal agreements or guidelines.172 What matters is the intent of the parties 
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and whether they can be said to have agreed to something under international law. 
Klabbers convincingly coins the idea of “presumptive law” arguing that “in 
international affairs, emanations that are of normative significance and that are 
based on some form of consent by the relevant actor, must be presumed to be 
legally binding”. To rebut this presumption parties must then provide clear language 
or other contextual elements that demonstrate that the instrument is not binding or 
not part of international law.173 
 
That said, a lot of the new transnational activity described above does not fall under 
the traditional sources of international law set out in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, e.g. 
because there is sufficient evidence that the state parties did not intend to agree 
under international law174 or because the actors involved (be it public agencies or 
private actors) do not have the capacity to create international law in the first 
place.175 However, the mere fact that something falls on the non-law side does not 
preclude that it is regulated by law or needs justification under law. Especially where 
a non-law instrument still has legal effects (and may thereby restrict freedom) such 
justification or regulation by law becomes crucial. As a result, even where a soft law 
or informal law instrument is not as such “international law”, it could still (i) have legal 
effects, and/or (ii) be subject to legal constraints (or be regulated by law), be it under 
international law, domestic law or the rules internal to the mechanism where the 
instrument was created. 
 
b. The emergence of procedural meta-norms for any normative restriction on 
freedom 
 
When an instrument does not meet the threshold of law (i.e. traditional international 
law before an international tribunal), serious thought must be given to what legal 
effects it may still have and how to control these effects. Checks and balances are 
needed which should involve an examination of (i) the source, respectability and 
authority of the norm creating body, (ii) transparency, openness and neutrality in the 
norm’s procedural elaboration and (iii) the substantive quality, consistency and 
overall acceptance (consensus) of the norm. Schepel refers to these collectively as 
rules of “procedural integrity” adding that such control by international tribunals (e.g. 
the WTO) over outside norms “exercises an upward pull on the work of private 
standardizers”.176 Scott and Sturm have referred to this judicial control as “courts as 
                                                                                                                                           
understanding, the so-called CARU minutes, between the Foreign Ministers of Uruguay and 
Argentina is binding under international law: ‘Whatever its specific designation and in 
whatever instrument it may have been recorded (the CARU minutes), this “understanding” is 
binding on the Parties, to the extent that they have consented to it and must be observed by 
them in good faith’; likewise, at 149, the ICJ treats a 2005 press communiqué between 
Argentina and Uruguay, laying down a procedural obligation, as a binding agreement, just not 
having the contents that Uruguay claimed it had). 
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 Klabbers chapter 10, OUP book. D’Aspremont supra note 59 goes a step further and 
suggests to drop “intent” as the law-ascertainment criterion altogether and to replace it with a 
more formal criterion focused on the instrumentum or form used to memorialize agreement 
(the so-called “container”) rather than on what parties intended or agreed on (the negotium or 
so-called “content”), more specifically “by a systemic use of written linguistic indicators”.  
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 See, for example, the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds: “… the Forum shall 
not be a formal supranational authority and its work shall not carry any legal force” (Kuwait 
Declaration: Establishment of the International Forum of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 6 April 
2009, available at: http://www.iwg-swf.org/mis/kuwaitdec.htm), discussed in Malathouni, 
Chapter 7, TOAEP book. 
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 As the ISO puts it: “the agency neither regulates, nor creates laws” (quoted in Geraets and 
Duquet, Chapter 11, TOAEP book). 
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 See Schepel, Chapter 16, OUP book (lamenting that the refusal by the WTO Appellate 
Body to engage in such control in EC – Sardines “treats standards as mere facts, which 
makes for terrible legal policy”. In support: S. Bernstein and E. Hannah, Non-State Global 
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catalysts”.177 Krisch’s theory of post-national pluralism is grounded in the choices 
and allegiances of individuals and gives different weight to norms depending on their 
“public autonomy credentials”, an assessment that includes some of the elements 
listed above.178 These three criteria – referring to authority, procedure and substance 
-- also link back to the very definition of IN-LAW as we have defined it, involving new 
actors, processes and outputs as well as to the benchmark of “thick consensus” 
described above which is slowly emerging as a “code of good practice” in the 
standard-setting world and beyond.179  
 
The legal techniques that can then be used by international tribunals to refer to these 
outside norms – e.g. Basel or ISO standards, ICH or IBA guidelines − could be 
reliance on them as facts or treaty interpretation, e.g. interpreting a treaty with 
reference to these outside norms as reflecting a “good faith” interpretation, “ordinary 
meaning” (if a general dictionary can provide ordinary meaning, why not a standard 
or guideline developed by experts in the specific field?), “subsequent agreement” or 
“subsequent practice” (both, however, focusing on “agreement” or practice 
establishing “the agreement” of state parties, not other actors) or other “relevant 
rules of international law” (although the latter would pre-suppose that the outside 
norms are actually part of international law).180 Certain treaties may also directly or 
indirectly incorporate or make reference to such outside norms or standards (as the 
SPS and TBT agreements do at the WTO referring, for example, to Codex and ISO 
standards).181 This, of course, facilitates making a bridge to them.  
 
When it comes to the check and balances to be applied to these outside norms – the 
procedural meta-norms related to authority, procedure and substance referred to 
earlier − on what legal basis could those be relied on? An argument could be made 
that they are emerging as norms of customary international law or general principles 
of law, traditional sources that are referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. Note, 
indeed, that pursuant to Article 38, “conventions” must be recognized by “states” 
thereby apparently excluding new actors.182 In contrast, for “custom” and “general 
principles” there is no explicit reference to “states”. Custom is defined as “evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law”, without specifying who must have accepted 
this practice as “law”. General principles of law, in turn, must be “recognized by 
civilized nations”, where the word “nation” could be understood more broadly than 
central state actors alone. Both custom and general principles thereby leave the door 
                                                                                                                                           
Standard Setting and the WTO: legitimacy and the need for regulatory space’, (2008) 11 
Journal of International Economic Law 575. 
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 See supra note 120. 
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 Krisch, supra note 125, at 101 (“the weight of a collective’s claim will follow from the 
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 See the ISEAL Code of Good Practice for Setting Standards, available at 
http://www.isealalliance.org/code. This Code of Good Practice is imposed on ISEAL’s 
membership, including the Forest Stewardship Council, the Rainforest Alliance, the Marine 
Stewardship Council, the Fair Trade Labelling Organization, and others. As Schepel, Chapter 
16, OUP book, notes: “These procedures were not adopted spontaneously out of a collective 
civic awakening: they have evolved in response to demands by public authorities and courts”.  
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 See Articles 31(1) to 31(3) of the Vienna Convention. See also Article 31(4): “A special 
meaning [which could draw on outside norms or standards] shall be given to a term if it is 
established that the parties so intended”. 
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 See also the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport which expressly 
refers to the World Anti-Doping Agency and its Code, and requires that States align their anti-
doping legislation with the WADC principles, discussed in Cassini, Chapter 18, OUP book. 
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 But see Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which does refer to 
other subjects, discussed supra note 63. 
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open to new actors as well as new types of processes and outputs.183 Checks and 
balances have been developing internally within each normative sub-system (be it 
the ISO, ICH or Basel Committee). Reference has been made to reflexive 
governance184, the self-generated internal law of administration185 or a variety of 
system-specific deontologies which replace morals with professional standards.186 
Over time, convergence around certain procedural meta-norms that apply across the 
board may emerge. This will take time and we may not have reached that stage yet. 
More experimentation, trial and error are needed. This is normal. Ladeur describes, 
for example, how domestic German administrative law developed not starting from 
general codes imposed by the legislator or courts.187 Rather, principles emerged 
from the practice within administrative agencies. The same process is occurring at 
the international level. Time will tell whether procedural meta-norms will arise and on 
what legal basis they will then be enforced.188 It may well be that they will be codified 
in a treaty or other standard or agreement. They could also develop through the case 
law or jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals189, or emerge as general 
principles of law or even custom. The attraction of such procedural meta-principles is 
that, as procedural rules, they may attract universal support. That way, international 
law may continue to play its “neutral” role.190 More than thirty years ago, Herbert 
Simon has pointed out that, from the perspective of decision theory, when it comes 
to highly complex problems or constellations it is impossible to achieve absolute 
agreement of all actors involved through rational deliberation as there is always more 
dissent and non-knowledge than available knowledge and agreement. As a result, 
the only viable kind of rationality is, in his words, “procedural rationality”, that is, a 
rational and agreed-upon way to organize a decision-making process.191 
  
Tribunals may then consider or not consider a norm and give it varying degrees of 
weight the way they evaluate, weigh and refer to other “legal facts” (be it in the 
process of establishing facts, legal interpretation or application of law to facts). 
Ultimately, however, this may lead to a paradox. For formal or traditional 
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international law to arise “thin” state consent suffices (as discussed above, the 
validation rules of international law are agnostic when it comes to process, actors 
involved, instrument or substance). In contrast, for other norms or standards to 
merely have legal effects, the above criteria of a “thick consensus” must be met, 
examining both the source (authority) and the procedural and substantive quality of 
the norm. The test for “mere” legal effects is thereby stricter than the test for actual 
“law”. If one believes in the full, legitimizing effect of state consent, this may not be a 
paradox at all: whereas legal effects do not require consent by each state (and 
therefore need justification on other grounds), for something to be international law, 
the stop-clause of state consent is, at least under current international law standards, 
both a sufficient and necessary condition. Another way to alleviate this tension is, of 
course, to gradually move to a test of “thick consensus” for both formal law and other 
norms or standards with merely legal effects. Yet, for that to happen a fundamental 
reassessment of traditional international law would be called for: a shift from “thin 
consent” to “thick consensus”.192 
 
c. A few examples 
 
A good, recent example of how traditional international law is grappling with novel 
forms of governance and standard-setting can be found in the US – Tuna II dispute 
recently decided at the WTO.193 In that dispute, Mexico challenged the labeling 
requirements imposed by the United States in respect of tuna products and when 
such products could be labeled as “dolphin-safe”. Whereas the US adopted a 
unilateral standard (“no setting of fishing nets on dolphins” tout court), Mexico 
claimed that tuna meeting its standard (“no mortality or serious injury of dolphins”) 
should also get the US “dolphin-safe” label. Mexico’s standard was, moreover, based 
on the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP) and 
resolutions adopted under the AIDCP, to which Mexico, the US and 12 other 
countries are a party. A core question that arose in this dispute was whether the 
AIDCP labeling requirements could be regarded as an “international standard” on 
which the US should base its national standard pursuant to Article 2.4 of the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). The test employed by the WTO 
panel and Appellate Body in this respect goes in the direction of the “thick 
consensus” test discussed above. This is the case, importantly, even though the 
instruments under examination (in particular the AIDCP treaty) were ultimately 
traditional international law instruments. With reference to definitions found in the 
standardization world (ISO/IEC Guide 2:1991) and a non-binding decision adopted 
by the WTO’s TBT Committee194, the panel imposed the following requirements for 
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something to be an “international standard”. The document must be (1) a “standard” 
that was (2) “adopted by an international standardizing/standards organization” and 
(3) “made available to the public”. For the document to be a standard, it must (i) “be 
established by consensus”, (ii) “be approved by a recognized body”, and (iii) “provide 
for common and repeated use, rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or 
their results aimed at the achievement of the optimum degree of order in a given 
context”. An international standardizing organization, in turn, is (i) a "body that has 
recognized activities in standardization" and (ii) “whose membership is open to the 
relevant national body from every country", in casu, every WTO member (although 
this ensures inclusiveness of all national bodies; it does not ensure participation by 
other stakeholders). Made available to the public, finally, includes respect for certain 
transparency procedures concerning elaboration, dissemination and implementation.  
 
Based on this definition, the WTO panel found that the AIDCP labelling requirements 
do constitute an “international standard”.  The Appellate Body, in contrast, though 
not disagreeing with the panel’s definition, was not convinced that membership in the 
AIDCP was open to the relevant bodies of at least all WTO Members. It was, in 
particular, not persuaded that being invited to join the AIDCP is a mere “formality” 
since to invite new members consensus of all AIDCP parties is required.195  The 
United States pointed out, for example, that although all states whose vessels fish 
for tuna in the area were eligible, WTO members with an interest other than fishing 
such as consumer or conservation interests were ineligible to become parties.196  
The Appellate Body agreed that “an international standardizing body must not 
privilege any particular interests in the development of international standards” and 
underscored “the imperative that international standardizing bodies ensure 
representative participation and transparency in the development of international 
standards”.197  
 
For something to be an “international standard”, relevant in WTO adjudication, both 
source (authority) and procedural and substantive requirements must therefore be 
met (crucial elements of the “thick consensus” benchmark discussed above). These 
requirements are fundamentally different from what is required for the establishment 
of international law, including the WTO treaty itself (“thin consent”).  In particular, 
where the WTO requires “consent” (as in veto power for each WTO member), 
“consensus” in the TBT/international standards sense is defined (in ISO/IEC Guide 
2) with reference not only to who ultimately must agree/has veto rights (more lenient 
than “thin consent”) but also with reference to process, who must be heard and how 
must disagreements be weighed (stricter than “thin consent”).198  In addition, if one 
were to apply the WTO’s test of what constitutes an “international body” to the WTO 
itself, the WTO would fail as it is not “open” to all countries but subject to rigorous 
accession requirements and veto by all existing WTO members. 
 
In the investment context as well, norms enacted by new actors and in new forms 
play an increasing role. Tribunals frequently refer to and apply, for example, rules 
developed by the privately run International Bar Association (IBA) (e.g. the Rules on 
the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration and the Guidelines on 
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Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration).199 These rules do not have the force 
of law, have never been consented to by states and are normally not incorporated in 
the arbitration rules by the disputing parties. Instead, they were developed by 
experts and the epistemic community of global arbitration. Questions have been 
raised about their legitimacy and whether such instruments are “a tool by which the 
arbitration elite maintains its power and control over international arbitration”.200 One 
solution is to subject these instruments to the source (authority), procedural and 
substantive elements of the “thick consensus” test discussed earlier. Along similar 
lines, Kaufmann-Kohler has suggested to “integrate users in the process of soft law 
creation [“generally weaker parties that are not commercial or business players, but 
rather consumers, athletes, employees and the like”], thereby extending the 
consultation beyond the service providers (arbitral institutions, counsel, arbitrators) 
presently involved”.201 In addition to such inclusiveness, “thick consensus” would 
also test (i) the source and authority of the norm creating body, (ii) transparency, 
openness and neutrality in the norm’s procedural elaboration and (iii) the substantive 
quality, consistency and overall acceptance (consensus) of the norm. 
 
Interestingly, however, a recent arbitration tribunal, acting not in the field of 
investment arbitration, but under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, refused 
to refer to the same IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest. It did so explicitly relying 
on the “thin consent” paradigm discussed earlier (rather than applying the idea of 
“thick consensus” which the WTO panel on US - Tuna II opted for).202 This arbitration 
tribunal was, of course, bound by the applicable law under the Law of the Sea 
Convention (whereas the WTO panel in US - Tuna II had an explicit mandate to refer 
to “international standards” under the TBT Agreement). That said, as discussed 
earlier, also this UNCLOS tribunal could have derived some guidance from the IBA 
Guidelines if only as relevant facts or as normative guidance to interpret or shed light 
on the applicable UNCLOS provisions the state parties agreed on, at least to the 
extent these Guidelines emanate from a respected authority, were elaborated in an 
open and fair process and have over the years attracted support amounting to a 
consensus in the arbitral community (the “thick consensus” benchmark).  
 
9. CONCLUSION 
 
There is strong evidence that the field of international law is in a process of 
stagnation, both quantitatively (number of treaties) and qualitatively (thin state 
consent followed by domestic rubber-stamping by Parliament or Congress). New, 
alternative forms of cross-border cooperation have emerged and gained prominence 
especially since the 2000s. Not surprisingly, as insiders looking at new players 
joining the scene, international lawyers have focused their attention on whether 
these new forms are legitimate or even law in the first place. What has been 
neglected is an internal reflection on what these new forms tell us about traditional 
international law. This paper challenges the assumption that traditional international 
law is, by definition, legitimate and new forms must be presumed not to be. Instead, 
it points at “thin state consent” as the increasingly flimsy basis of traditional 
international law and an emerging, normatively superior benchmark of “thick 
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stakeholder consensus” that underlies many of the new forms of cooperation. Our 
point is not that new forms are without problems (some need, in particular, more 
input by external stakeholders and more domestic oversight), just that new and 
traditional must be continuously kept in check and, if so, that both can offer 
legitimate forms of cooperation. In the long term, we may see a transformation of 
international law towards the “thick consensus” benchmark, emancipating (but also 
controlling) new actors, new processes and new types of normative outputs.  History 
teaches us that we have seen other, equally dramatic changes in the international 
legal order since the Middle Ages. In the short to medium term, the core questions 
will be to define what is international law and how does or should it interact with new 
forms of cooperation. This paper argues that even non-law can have legal effects 
(and, if so, must be regulated by law), and that new forms of cooperation (assuming 
they are not already law) can be given legal effect already today by international 
courts, in particular when they meet the “thick stakeholder consensus” benchmark or 
triple barreled meta-norm of procedural integrity axed on (i) the source, 
respectability, and authority of the norm creating body, (ii) the transparency, 
openness, and neutrality in the norm’s procedural elaboration, and (iii) the 
substantive quality, consistency, and overall acceptance (consensus) and objectivity 
of the norm. If correct, this assessment has consequences for the entire discipline of 
international law, including law school teaching. Why is it, for example, that in the 
face of the stagnation of international law, law schools continue to teach only 
traditional international law and leave new forms of cooperation to international 
relations scholars? If we want to keep both the field and its students sociologically 
relevant we will need to look beyond the four corners of traditional actors, processes 
and outputs.  
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